Doesn't the ISDS give
foreign investors rights that domestic investors don't have?
Didn't the Productivity
Commission find in its 2010 Report on Bilateral Trade Agreements that foreign
investors have greater legal rights than domestic businesses because ISDS gives
them access to third party arbitration?
Isn't ISDS inherently anti-democratic
– it means that governments that want to take actions that they believe are in
the public interest, in the best interests of the nation, can find themselves
being sued by multinational corporations and brought before arbitrators who in
fact before or after the case might be hired by those same multinational
corporations?
Isn't the case being
brought by Philip Morris against the Australian Government over its plain
packaging regulation, using the ISDS clause in the Hong Kong trade treaty,
inherently undemocratic?
Given that a 2009
survey of ISDS found 33 cases with claims over $1 billion US, and more than 100
cases with claims between US $100 million and US $ 900 million, it's not right
that the Philip Morris case is an isolated one.
Why does this Treaty
have an ISDS clause and the Japanese treaty not have one? If the Japanese were
happy enough to sign a Trade Agreement without an ISDS clause, why weren't the
Koreans?
What did we get out of
the Korean deal, as compared with the Japanese deal, that made this handcuff on
our democracy worthwhile?
What modelling has been
done to establish the likely impact of KAFTA on Australian manufacturing?
When you were
negotiating the Korean deal, did you ask the Australian motor vehicle
manufacturers Ford Holden and Toyota whether a bilateral Trade Agreement with
Korea could risk bringing forward their closure date?
We have had evidence
that there is a risk that one or more of these companies could bring forward
their closure date. This would be terrible if it were true. It is absolutely
imperative that the automotive parts suppliers that presently depend on these
manufacturers get as much time as possible to find other markets or other
products, and imperative that the workers at these factories have as much time
as possible to find other jobs and develop other skills. The market theory is
that these workers and businesses can move to other parts of the economy, but
the market reality is that will not happen unless there is time. Ford is not
scheduled to close till October 2016, and Holden and Toyota say they will motor
on until 2017. Don't we need to hang on to this, rather than walk away from it?
During the course of
the negotiations, who did you consult and in what detail?
The reason I ask is
that the question of consultation has been highly controversial in evidence
before the committee. On the one hand we have unions and civil society saying
the se bilateral trade agreements are a closed book. No-one sees them till they
are signed and they are then presented to the Parliament on a take it or leave
it basis. They say there is nowhere near enough consultation or transparency.
Then on the other hand we have the agribusinesses who give completely opposite
evidence saying they couldn't be happier with the consultation and give the
Department absolutely glowing reports. Now I think you would
agree that all sorts of people have vested interests in these Trade Agreements –
agribusinesses, manufacturers, unions, farmers, internet service providers,
copyright holders, consumers and so on. Am I right in thinking that there is a
double standard at work – that some people are kept in the loop, while others
are kept in the dark?
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